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Abstract
This paper shows that the two main models in the buﬀer stock saving literature can
be nested in a model that varies the level of available social insurance. Equivalently, the
assumption about the time series process for labor income (and social insurance during
unemployment) is crucial in determining the level (but not the shape) of optimal consumption
as a function of liquid wealth.
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Ac h i e fm o d i ﬁcation to the classic Permanent Income-Life Cycle Hypothesis (PIH) is the so-
called buﬀer-stock model of precautionary saving, pioneered by the work of Deaton (1991)
and Carroll (1992, 1997). The model modiﬁes the PIH framework to allow for precaution-
ary saving motives and restrictions on borrowing and has become a workhorse of modern
day consumer theory. Buﬀer stock saving behavior can arise from (at least) two distinct
assumptions. Deaton (1991) explicitly imposes a no borrowing constraint but assumes that
the agent is always employed (and therefore always receives a positive (but possibly small))
income transfer. Carroll (1992), on the other hand, generates endogenously a no borrowing
constraint by assuming that with a very small probability, an individual will receive a zero,
transitory, labor income shock (and therefore zero labor income for ever is a possibility),
implying that the agent will optimally never want to borrow given that the marginal utility
of zero consumption is inﬁnite. In this formulation, the agent may face an unemployment
spell but receives zero labor income in that period.
It can be argued that the two assumptions lie at the two ends of a spectrum of empiri-
cally plausible possibilities. Speciﬁcally, individuals facing unemployment typically receive
a certain level of unemployment insurance in that state. For instance, Nickell et. al. (2001)
report the replacement ratio of wage income once unemployed and the duration over which
unemployment is paid in OECD economies between 1960 and 1995. In the period 1988-95,
the lowest annual replacement ratio in the OECD is 22 percent (in the UK). The U.S. and
Australia are close seconds with a 26 percent unemployment beneﬁt replacement ratio. On
the contrary, many European countries have replacement ratios close to sixty percent, il-
lustrating their more generous beneﬁt systems (a notable exception is Italy). Taking the
duration of beneﬁts into account, Nickell et. al (2001) conclude that a reasonable range
of values for the level of unemployment beneﬁts in the OECD over 1960 − 1995 would be
between ten and seventy percent of mean labor income. Moreover, for the 1988-1995 period,
this range can be reduced to somewhere between thirty and seventy percent of mean labor
income.
This paper investigates the implications for optimal consumption when varying the level
2of available social insurance and shows that if the unemployment beneﬁt is high enough, the
model collapses to the model originally studied by Deaton (1991). If, on the other hand,
t h eu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁt is virtually non-existent, then the Carroll (1992) policy function
results. Depending on the level of available social insurance, a range of consumption func-
tions between these two extreme cases exists, illustrating the importance of the time series
process for labor income on the level of optimal consumption. These results indicate ﬁrstly
that the institutional setting providing social insurance can be an important determinant of
optimal consumption decision making and might therefore be one explanatory variable in
the determinants of consumption dynamics across diﬀerent countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares the two diﬀerent
methods for generating buﬀer stock saving behavior and Section 3 describes the results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Microeconomic Consumption Models: Alternative
Ways of Generating Buﬀer Stock Saving Behavior
This section presents the model of individual consumption behavior; the framework can nest
the models analyzed in Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992, 1997). Time is discrete and agents
have an inﬁnite horizon. We assume there is one non-durable good and one ﬁnancial asset
(a riskless bond). The asset yields a constant, after tax, gross, risk-free, real return, Rf.A t
time t, the agent enters the period with assets held over from last period (Ait), and receives
Yit units of the non-durable good from inelastically supplying one unit of labor. The agent








Ait+1 =( Rf)(Ait + Yit − Cit) (2)
3where E0 is the expectation conditional on information available at time 0, and β = 1
1+δ is
the constant discount factor. We assume that preferences are of the constant relative risk




1−ρ when ρ > 0; if ρ =1 ,U (Ct)=l nCt.
2.1 Labor Income Process
The speciﬁcation of the labor income process is very important in this setup and will eﬀec-
tively diﬀerentiate between the two models that generate buﬀer stock saving behavior. The
growth in individual labor income (during employment) follows
∆lnYit =l nGt +l nNit +l nUit − lnUit−1, (3)




u). This process has a single Wold representation that is equiv-
alent to the MA(1) process for individual income growth estimated using household level
data (MaCurdy [1982], Abowd and Card [1989], and Pischke [1995]). The assumption that a
disastrous earnings shock can arise with a positive probability involves an assumption about
the transitory innovation, Uit. The level of transitory earnings in the disastrous state can be
thought of as unemployment insurance and the probability of receiving it as the probability
of becoming unemployed for one year.
2.2 Diﬀerent Models for Buﬀer Stock Saving
Two distinct methods have been used to generate no-borrowing behavior. An exogenous
imposition of a no-borrowing constraint was used by Deaton (1991) who assumed that
Ait+1 > 0. The second method assumes that the consumer will receive zero transitory
labor income (Uit =0 )in any given period with a small probability (Carroll, 1992, 1997).
The positive probability of receiving a zero transitory labor income shock can be inter-
preted as the probability of unemployment. To the extent that unemployment spells im-
ply zero labor income (associated with the lack of any social insurance mechanism), a no-
borrowing constraint can be generated endogenously by taking advantage of the assumption
4that limc→0 U0(C) →∞ ; a backward induction argument can then be used to show that it
is optimal for these consumers never to borrow.
In this paper, the implications of the diﬀerent assumptions in generating buﬀer stock
behavior are investigated by explicitly imposing the liquidity constraint and assuming that
in the event of a disastrous labor income shock there exists a positive, lower bound on
the transitory labor income shock (Uit). In the event that this innovation is very close to
zero, the explicit imposition of a liquidity constraint does not matter because the individual,
anticipating this possibility, will optimally never want to borrow and the policy function will
be the one derived by Carroll (1992, 1997). To make clear the discussion that follows, I call
this the “precautionary savings buﬀer stock model” since it is the precautionary motive that
generates the voluntary liquidity constraint. As the magnitude of social insurance rises, the
constraint will be important in preventing the individual from borrowing. This is the model
with a positive income ﬂoor and can be called a “liquidity constraints buﬀer stock model”
since the liquidity constraint is now needed to prevent borrowing. When the income ﬂoor
is not explicitly imposed but is implied by the labor income process, the model is the one
studied by Deaton (1991).
2.3 Euler Equation
Following Deaton (1991), we deﬁne “cash-on-hand”, Xit, a st h es u mo fc u r r e n ti n c o m ea n d
assets, Yit+Ait which evolves according to Xit+1 = Rf(Xit−Cit)+Yit+1. Given the borrowing





If the agent is constrained at time t, the maximum that can be spent on consumption is the
cash on hand (Xit), implying that marginal utility can never be less than U0(Xit).
Given that individual earnings process is nonstationary, we normalize by the permanent
component of earnings, Pit. Letting lower case letters denote the normalized variables,





Taking advantage of the homogeneity of degree (−ρ) of the marginal utility function U0(.)






We make the following additional assumption:
βEt{Rf(Gt+1Nit+1)
−ρ} < 1 (6)
that gives the “impatience” condition common to buﬀer-stock models which ensures that
borrowing is part of the unconstrained plan.
3 Consumption Implications from Varying the Unem-
ployment Beneﬁt
3.1 Parameter Choice
We begin by solving an annual frequency version of the model under a set of “baseline”
parameter assumptions and then move on to ask how our results vary when these parameter
v a l u e sa r ec h a n g e d . W es e tt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,δ,e q u a lt o0.05, and the constant
real interest rate, r,e q u a lt o0.02. Carroll (1992) estimates the variances of the idiosyncratic
s h o c k su s i n gd a t af r o mt h ePanel Study of Income Dynamics, an annual data set, and our
baseline simulations use values close to values in that paper: 0.10 for σu and 0.08 for σn.
The unemployment beneﬁt will be varied from 0.1 to 70 percent of mean labor income that
appear to be the most relevant for existing arrangements in OECD economies. We set the
mean (µg) and standard deviation (σg) of aggregate labor income equal to 0.02 and 0.025,
respectively.
3.2 Policy Function Comparison
The individual consumption policy rules that result from varying the lowest earnings real-
ization relative to the Deaton (1991) policy function are plotted in ﬁgures 1 − 4.A t o n e
extreme, the Carroll (1997) policy function is being plotted; in that case the probability of
6b e i n gu n e m p l o y e di na n yg i v e np e r i o di s0.5 percent. At the other extreme, the Deaton
(1991) policy function where the probability of being unemployed is zero is also shown. In
between these extremes, a “liquidity constraint buﬀer stock saving model” exists where the
liquidity constraint is explicitly imposed and the agent faces a 0.5 percent probability of
being unemployed but in that state receives a certain fraction of mean earnings (0.1 in the
ﬁgures denotes a transfer equal to ten percent of mean earnings).
Figure 1 plots the consumption policy function for ρ =2for the two extremes (Carroll
vs Deaton). For any given level of cash on hand, total saving is higher in the precautionary
savings than in the liquidity constraints buﬀer stock model. Moreover, consumption equals
cash on hand using the liquidity constraint approach until levels of liquid wealth close to
ninety ﬁve percent of mean labor income, whereas consumption is lower than cash on hand
in the precautionary savings model for very low levels of cash on hand. Increasing the
level of unemployment beneﬁtt o0.1 (ten percent of mean labor income) in ﬁgure 2 results
in a consumption policy rule that more closely matches the Deaton (1991) model, namely
t h a tc o n s u m p t i o ne q u a l sc a s ho nh a n df o rl o wl e v e l so fl i q u i dw e a l t h ,b u tn e v e r t h e l e s ss t i l l
generates a higher level of saving.
Figure 3 illustrates that if the unemployment beneﬁt is raised to around 40 percent of
mean labor income, then the two policy functions collapse to the same rule. We can now
see that the two assumptions used to generate buﬀer stock saving generate consumption
functions that lie in between the two extremes. At one end, for instance, the truly disastrous
labor income shock being equal to zero generates the Carroll (1992) model. At the other
extreme, if the lowest labor income shock is suﬃciently high, then the Deaton (1991) model
arises. In between these extreme cases, however, there is a range of consumption policy
functions that arise by varying the value of labor income received in the disastrous state.
Figure 4 plots the results from the comparative statics exercise of raising the CRRA
coeﬃcient from ρ =2to ρ =3 . The results are as expected, with higher level of savings for
stronger prudence. One important diﬀerence between the Carroll and Deaton speciﬁcations
arises, however. In the Deaton model, consumption equals cash on hand until around 95
percent of mean labor income. Stronger prudence does not signiﬁcantly alter this implication
of the model; higher saving only arises when the liquidity constraint stops being binding.
7In the Carroll speciﬁcation, on the other hand, the liquidity constraint stops being binding
earlier, and therefore stronger prudence aﬀects the consumption/savings decision at a much
lower level of cash on hand. The divergence of consumption from cash on hand at much
lower levels of liquid wealth for lower levels of unemployment insurance is an important
diﬀerence between the two models since the saving ratio plays an important role in smoothing
consumption ﬂuctuations.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The “liquidity constraints buﬀer stock model” can replicate the policy functions generated
in Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997) by varying the amount of available social insurance. In
general, the explicit imposition of a liquidity constraint allows the researcher to investigate
the implications of institutional social insurance arrangements on the optimal consump-
tion/savings decision.
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